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Abstract 
 
In divided societies that endure intrastate violence, ethnonational groups harness memory to support 
claims for territorial sovereignty and victimhood. Yet, in peace processes, rather than seek to deal 
with the legacy of the past, the state often enacts a culture of amnesia to support the logic of political 
transition, while at the communal level the rival ethnic groups proliferate commemorative practices 
as part of memorywars. These twin forces – amnesia and ethnicized memory – are also often 
embedded into postconflict urban reconstruction, particularly the city centres of the municipal 
capitals. In this paper, I explore how non-sectarian movements imprint memory into city centre space 
to challenge the paradoxical forces of forgetting and ethnic communal remembrance. Towards this, I 
explore the memorywork of non-sectarian groups whose politics transcend established ethnic 
cleavages, such as trade unionists, movements resisting the privatization of public space and activists 
mobilizing to protect public services. In this paper I draw on a range of theoretical frameworks, 
including reflective nostalgia and ghosts and hauntings. Using fieldwork data, I look at non-sectarian 
memorywork in Beirut and Belfast city centres. These city centres generate contrasting uses and 
meanings for the local population. 
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Introduction 
While ethnonational conflict cannot simply be attributed to ancient hatreds, ethnic 
groups construct memory to advance divisive contemporary political projects. Nora’s 
(1989) lieu de mémoire – memory space – is violently apposite to intrastate conflict 
where contested claims to territorial sovereignty are supported by remembrance 
practices. Ethnonationalists perform memory to invoke prior tempore, potior iure – 
the claim that they are the true tenants of the sacred homeland. They mark public 
space to commemorate historical traumatic events that constantly remind members to 
remain vigil of their victimhood status and that violent defence of the ethnic 
community remains always necessary. Given this nexus between remembrance, space 
and conflict in divided societies, policymakers and scholars stress the need for 
peacebuilding to address memory. As McDowell and Braniff (2014, p.1) argue, ‘in 
the context of conflict resolution, remembrance is a crucial element of the healing 
process’. 
 Despite the significance of space and memory to reconciliation, its potential is 
frustrated in the postconflict period. At the level of the state, a policy of forgetting is 
commonly imposed as part of the logic of political transition, while ethnicized 
memorywars proliferate at the community scale. In this paper I take an alternative 
perspective by analysing how marginalized groups in divided societies imprint 
memory into public space to challenge the paradoxical forces of amnesia and ethnic 
communal remembrance. Towards this, I explore the memorywork of non-sectarian 
groups whose politics and membership cross-established ethnic cleavages. These 
groups range from trade unionists, movements resisting the privatization of public 
space, and activists mobilizing to protect public services.  
3 
 
 I argue that these non-sectarian movements use memory to advance 
peacebuilding in complex ways that are not always classified as traditional forms of 
conflict resolution. They engage in activities, for instance, to promote equality for 
women, to demand better terms for workers, for better public services, and to resist 
private interests gentrifying urban spaces. In calling for these changes, these 
movements strive to disrupt the grammar that supports sectarianism in the divided 
society (Nagle, 2016a). 
 The construction and performance of memory is fundamental to the politics of 
these groups. These movements harness the power of memory, haunting, ghosts and 
history to foster peacebuilding and to demand access to public services and rights in 
the present. On the one hand, these movements contest amnesiac narratives promoted 
by state actors and their neoliberal partners which obscure the present reality of 
increasing sectarian and socioeconomic inequality. On the other hand, they challenge 
communal remembrance narratives that frame the divided society as places replete 
with unchanging narratives of ethnic separation. These non-sectarian movements do 
this by revealing hidden, marginalized and complex histories of momentary and 
sustained peaceful interaction and solidarity between groups. Their activism reveals 
alternative pasts and they open up the possibility for future forms of progressive 
political community. These movements invest key public spaces and sites with 
particular memories. 
 I draw on a range of theoretical frameworks to examine non-sectarian memory 
and space. To help distinguish non-sectarian memory from ethnicized memory and 
amnesia I apply Svetlana Boym’s (2001) helpful distinction between restorative and 
reflective nostalgia, which are not absolute types, but rather tendencies of giving 
meaning to a longing for the past. In addition, I turn to the literature on ghosts and 
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haunting (Edensor, 2005; Gordon, 1997; Vanolo, 2017), memories that expose ‘what's 
been suppressed or concealed is very much alive and present, messing … with those 
always incomplete forms of … repression ceaselessly directed towards us’ (Gordon, 
1997, p.2).  
 In this paper I examine non-sectarian memory in divided cities that have 
experienced protracted ethnic/ethnonational violence. More specifically, I look at 
non-sectarian memorywork in the city centre spaces of these divided cities. These city 
centres contain the main political, economic and cultural institutions of the state. 
These spaces ‘are not just reflections or traces of political power: they are often 
instruments and sources of political power’ (Friedland & Hecht, 1998, p.147). For this 
reason, they are ‘battlegrounds of national memory’ (Nagel, 2002) as contending 
ethnonational groups and political elites compete to control these spaces. At the same 
time, city centres are civic, cosmopolitan spaces where individuals can coalesce to 
constitute new forms of community that transcend ethnic cleavages. 
 Two city centres  – Belfast, the capital of Northern Ireland, and Beirut, the 
capital of Lebanon – provide important case studies for comparative research to 
illuminate these dynamics. While these two spaces endured ‘ethnic’ violence, the two 
city centres symbolize contrasting collective memories for its inhabitants. Beirut’s 
city centre – known as the ‘bourj’ – is fondly remembered as the ‘heart of Beirut’ 
(Khalaf, 2006), a place that functioned prior to the civil war as a rare shared civic 
space in a segregated city. The rival ethnonational groups, alternatively, often 
remember Belfast city centre as a space historically subject to ethnicized contestation 
(Nagle, 2009a). Both city centres have undergone forms of regeneration and 
gentrification as part of their respective peace processes with urban destruction 
transformed into the new chic. In Beirut, the effect of this process is an amnesiac 
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space that not only effaces all reference to the civil war but also obscures the city 
centre’s vital role as a shared space. In Belfast, the regeneration of the city centre 
reflects the ‘accomodationist’ logic of the peace process – it has become a ‘shared 
space’ which is supposed to peacefully accommodate both ethnonational groups’ 
identities. In exploring non-sectarian memories, I look at how Lebanese movements 
challenge the dangerous process of amnesia. In Northern Ireland, I examine the use of 
memory by non-sectarian movements to provide progressive alternatives to ethnic 
accomodationism and forgetting.  
 This article features extensive ethnographic fieldwork carried out in Belfast 
and Beirut. Belfast and Beirut provide important case-studies for comparative 
research on violently divided cities. Multiple, interlocking forms of sectarian division 
characterize these cities: the respective groups often possess distinct media outlets, 
schools and political parties to ensure that elections resemble de facto ethnic censuses. 
This division is reinforced by residential segregation so that levels of intergroup 
distrust are strong. Yet, the divided city does not completely foreclose non-ethnic 
forms of identity and political mobilization. In these places there is also a significant 
section of the population defying easy assimilation into homogeneous ethnic 
categories. While the divided society is a generator of conflict, it is also a dynamic 
environment where hostile ethnic identities and politics are challenged and even 
transformed.  
 The movements examined in this paper were selected since they not only self-
identify as non-sectarian; they also represent a spectrum of non-ethnic issues, ranging 
from labour movements, activists concerned with protecting city spaces from postwar 
privatization, and movements demanding better public services. Although these 
movements do not necessarily align on any particular ideology, in their respective 
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cities they do often form networks and alliances given their shared commitment to 
providing pluralistic and progressive forms of mobilization that eschew and contest 
antagonistic sectarian identity politics. Thus, struggles for decent public goods and 
spaces, against corruption also represent battle lines against the hegemony of 
sectarianism. 
 In Beirut and Belfast I conducted ethnographic research with a range of non-
sectarian movements: LGBT, feminist, environmentalist movements and campaigners 
protecting public spaces, buildings and goods. My research with movements in these 
two cities encompassed interviews with activists, participant observation at events and 
the collection of materials, pamphlets and public policy documents. Non-sectarian 
activists, especially individuals seen to transgress communal boundaries, can 
encounter threats from within and outside of their perceived ethnic group and may 
even be labelled as communal ‘traitors’. My research, accordingly, required caution 
when approaching and interviewing non-sectarian activists and, for this reason, 
activists featured in this article remain anonymous.  
 Belfast research has been on-going since 2007 and includes interviews (n=30). 
For Lebanon, ethnographic fieldwork was conducted during five distinct fieldwork 
phases (September 2012, July 2014, June 2015, January 2016, October 2017), each of 
which lasted from one week to a month and included 40 interviews with activists. 
Data capture and analysis used a constructivist epistemology and an interpretive 
framework. In the constructivist epistemology, the object of qualitative research is to 
understand that knowledge is gained through the social constructions of the 
individuals we research. The interpretative framework does not outline testable 
hypotheses, but instead focuses on understanding the social context in which 
individuals make sense of their subjective reality and attach meaning to it. 
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Space, Memory, Conflict and Peace 
Territory and space in divided societies derive paramount importance for 
ethnonationalist groups (Gaffikin, Mceldowney, & Sterrett, 2010). Groups construct 
ethnic identities by endowing place with ‘symbolic properties [that] contribute to a 
sense of ownership among its members’ (McDowell, Braniff, & Hughes, 2017, 
p.194). Ethnonationalist groups’ ‘willingness to fight for territory’, therefore, is less to 
do with the material value of the land than with the ‘symbolic role it plays in 
constituting people's identities and providing a sense of security and belonging’ 
(Gebrewold, 2009, p.16).  
 The performance of memory is vital to the project of cultivating an emotive 
attachment to a specific territory among group members. As Hoelscher and Alderman 
note (2004, p.347), ‘the preservation of recollections rests on their anchorage in 
space’. Memory is attached to spaces that are both concrete – such as memorials and 
buildings – and non-concrete and performative – such as parades and rituals. It is in 
this way that ‘memory crystallizes and secretes itself’ (Nora, 1989, p.7). In divided 
societies there is an over-production of ‘place memory’, in which groups construct 
memory in and through space to ensure the generation of inter and intracommunal 
violent conflict. Groups ethnicize urban space: symbolic devices like murals, flags, 
and commemorative street parades are markers of ethnonational identities and 
territorial belonging. These spaces allow groups to ‘assert control over geographic 
areas and support ideas of enclosed or sealed places’ (Graham and Nash, 2006, 
p.258), which have the correlative effect of restricting alternative ways of being. 
 Peacebuilding, therefore, requires a social imaginaire that connects this 
relationship intertwining space with memory (Megoran, 2011). In regards to space, 
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the political economy of postwar urban reconstruction is imbued by elites with the 
symbolism of rebuilding peace and the healing of ‘fissured social tensions on a 
material environment’ (Switzer & McDowell, 2009, p.341). Yet, while the formal 
reconstruction process rebuilds destroyed cityscapes, these spaces are programmed 
more to induce political forgetting than remembrance as an essential feature of 
reconciliation. A central reason for this is the character of urban reconstruction in 
postconflict divided city centres. The rebuilding process reproduces urban cloning, an 
identikit regeneration model used in many postindustrial cities around the world 
regardless of whether ethnic conflict has occurred. This model of reconstructing city 
centres is designed to expedite foreign direct investment, gentrification and 
privatization or – for more critical voices – a mode of neoliberal expropriation which 
masks continuing public disinvestment and economic inequality (Vanolo, 2017). 
 As part of the construction of the ‘entrepreneurial city’, city centres are 
subjected to branding strategies geared at ameliorating the city’s tarnished image, 
which will supposedly improve the municipality’s position in the market. While the 
branding process is designed to stimulate inward investment and tourism, it also 
derives a wider purpose of ‘civic boosterism’: fostering strong civic identities, 
loyalties and social cohesion among the city’s inhabitants. The composition of elite 
driven branding strategies render a schematized, labelled, univocal and linear 
narrative of the city centre which tames and romanticizes the disorderliness of the 
lived city (Till, 2012, p.5). Rebranded cities are thus labelled, for example, the ‘city of 
love’ or the ‘innovative city’ (Vanolo, 2017). 
 Such rebranding, while it may promote nostalgic visions of local heritage and 
identity, also conceals and forgets more problematic histories of violence and 
inequality. This dynamic of forgetting is acutely embedded into the branding 
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narratives of the divided city during the peace process. In rebranding the rebuilt city 
centre as a ‘shared city’ that looks towards the future rather than the past to foster 
reconciliation, the recent history of ethnic violence and conflict is ignored, which has 
the correlative effect of hindering peacebuilding. In Foote’s (1997) schemata of how 
societies mark sites that have experienced tragedy, rather than deploy ‘sanctification’ 
– the process of making a place sacred through the construction of durable 
commemorative markers  – the postconflict reconstructed city centre more typically 
entails ‘obliteration’ – the active effacement of the tragedy. Whereas sanctification is 
spurred by the wish to remember an event, obliteration stems from the desire to 
forget. In divided societies, the stimulus for amnesia broadly coincides with the 
interests of political and economic elites. For political elites, the material form of 
amnesia entrenched in postwar urban reconstruction intersects with their hope that 
society will forget the leading role that these elites played in perpetuating violence 
and instead see them as drivers of economic progress and security. The process of 
amnesia may also reflect a lack of consensus among the main groups regarding the 
memory of the ethnic conflict, which is seen as too divisive to broach. 
 Yet, attempts to write amnesia into the rebranded city centre are never as 
complete as its architects may hope. Groups may seek to mark these spaces with 
ethnicized commemorative parades. Individual citizens, furthermore, carry with them 
cognitive memory maps of the conflict that cannot simply be elided by the 
reconstruction process (Switzer & McDowell, 2009). In addition, old buildings, which 
developers have not been able to eradicate, remain as haunted ruins and painful 
reminders of the violence that occurred in these sites.  
 A number of scholars have summoned up the figure of the ghost and 
‘hauntology’ as a way of paradoxically illuminating the role of absences and invisible 
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presences in the political space, particularly in redeveloped cities (Edensor, 2005; 
Gordon, 1997; Vanolo, 2017). Ghosts represent complex forms of memory that resist 
blank slate ideologies and modes of political amnesia imposed by planners. Ghosts 
are also figures – individuals and groups  – that are not supposed to be visible in 
particular spaces. They have supposedly been socially cleansed from the city centre. 
Since they expose hidden narratives and injustices, ghosts can also point the way to 
alternative political projects.  
 Ghosts and haunted places contain a number of characteristics that 
problematize and contradict the rebranding narratives of city centres in divided cities.  
Ghosts interrupt the linear flow of history inscribed in branding exercises. Ghosts 
belong to a past which is absent in the present, but they also manifest their presence in 
the here-and-now. By simultaneously materializing and vanishing, ghosts subvert the 
flow of time. Since ghosts belong to specific locations, they stimulate multiple and 
complex emotions in those who encounter them. They are subjective and relational 
entities: different subjects may approach and may have very different ideas and 
understandings of ghosts. Ghosts, thus, destabilize conventional dichotomies 
opposing the living and the dead, the material and the immaterial, the real and the 
unreal (Vanolo, 2017). 
 
Beirut City Centre: The Construction of Nostalgia and Amnesia in the Bourj 
Starting in 1975 and ending in 1990, the Lebanese civil war left 170,000 dead 
(Trablousi, 2007). Although the civil war is simplistically framed as religious – 
between Christian and Muslim sects – it was complex and involved a succession of 
conflicts and interventions (Picard, 2002). The war involved ‘mass displacement, 
wide-scale killing, rape, torture, arbitrary detention, and enforced disappearances’ 
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(International Centre for Transitional Justice, 2014, p.1). The warlords tried to destroy 
‘all memories of coexistence and common interests between the Lebanese’ 
(Traboulsi, 2007, p.38) as ‘strategies of accommodation and avoidance were replaced 
by strategies of confrontation and radicalization’ (Picard, 2002, p.153).  
 Rather than engender reconciliation, the postwar era has seen the 
entrenchment of sectarianism in political and social life. In particular, the deployment 
of an ethnic quota system for political positions and public jobs perpetuate 
sectarianism as the foundation of society. Welfare services – especially healthcare and 
education – are placed under the control of many sectarian parties which they use to 
maintain clintelistic relationships with communal members. Thus, the sectarian 
system, incentivizes ‘sectarian identities and loyalties at the expense of trans-sectarian 
national ones’ (Salloukh et al., 2015, p.14).  At the same time, since the end of the 
war various ‘sectarian militias reorganized and rearmed themselves, and urban space 
was physically and symbolically divided into exclusive sectarian ghettos’ (Salloukh et 
al., 2015, p.29). For example, the proportion of Muslims living in East Beirut declined 
from 40 per cent to 5 per cent by the late 1980s (Khalaf, 2012, p.85). 
 During the civil war, the rival militias vied to control the city centre district, 
which came to represent that ‘Green Line’ – a buffer zone – separating Christian and 
Muslim Beirut. Despite the violence in the city centre, in Beirut’s collective memory 
the city centre represented the ‘bourj’ (‘the district’). Before the civil war the city 
centre ‘served as a vibrant and cosmopolitan melting pot of diverse groups and socio-
cultural transformations’ (Khalaf, 2012, p.90). In a state historically fragmented by 
sectarianism, the city centre symbolised a public sphere marked by pluralism and 
tolerance; it is remembered for its openness and fluidity and a capacity to 
accommodate multiple identities. As Makarem (2010) notes, the city centre could do 
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this because of its messiness – it hosted official state and municipal bureaucracies, 
cafes, popular markets and theatres, as well less reputable venues such as bars and 
gambling houses. As a civil society activist from a non-sectarian group remembered:  
 
The city centre was a place where you could not go to and stay entrenched in your provincial 
identity. It was a place where people needed to adjust to the fact that they are there with others 
who don’t have the same colloquial perspective, who don’t have the same belief, but they 
needed to interact with (interview, June 2015). 
 
 For many Beirutis the postwar rebuilding of the city centre needed to help heal 
the wounds of the war (Khalaf, 2006). The rebuilding of Beirut city was central to 
peacebuilding as it had the potential to foster a rare shared public sphere in a society 
in which public and urban space is increasingly sectarianized or privatized. As Khalaf 
(2006, p.1) argues, ‘the heart of the city was poised to re-invent itself as an open 
space in which diverse groups can celebrate their differences without indifference to 
each other’. This hope was frustrated: the postwar reconstruction of the city centre 
rendered the space amnesiac, with no reference to the history of sectarian violence, 
and exclusivist by de facto limiting public access. The rebuilding of Beirut’s city 
centre is best described as ‘the forgetful landscape’, a ‘concerted effort to bury and to 
deny the country’s more recent past’ (Nagel, 2002, p.724). 
 The exclusivist and amnesiac reconstructed city centre is fundamentally 
entwined with the logic of the peace process.  The signature of the 1989 peace 
agreement – ‘no victor, no vanquished’ – stated that no group could dominant the 
others (Nagle, 2016b). To create the new postwar order, ‘a strategy of oblivion was 
imposed in order to let the social system in place prevail’ (Haugbolle, 2010, p.70). In 
1991 the warlords passed amnesty Law 84, which selectively exonerated ‘political 
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crimes’ committed during the civil war (Picard, 2002, p.165). The amnesty allowed a 
number of warlords to become political leaders without fear of being prosecuted for 
war crimes. As one social movement activist for dealing with the past explained: 
 
When you know very well that all of the big projects undertaken in this country were just strengthening 
the rule of those former warlords who whitewashed their records thanks to Taef. You cannot tell me that 
with these people who promoted the religion of amnesia you can really build peace? (Personal 
communication, June 2015) 
 
The impulse for ‘collective amnesia’ (Khalaf, 2012, p.78) became sewn into the fabric 
of the reconstruction of Beirut city centre. Law 117 deliberately passed to enable 
reconstruction initiated the regeneration of Beirut city centre in 1991. Under Law 117 
a real estate company, Solidere – owned by the then Lebanese Prime Minister – was 
granted special powers of compulsory purchase and regulatory authority by the 
government to redevelop what it termed ‘Beirut Central District’ in the name of 
public interest. Property rights held by more than 120,000 in the area were transferred 
to Solidere (Leenders, 2012, p.183). Solidere have redeveloped 200 hectares of land 
valued at nearly one quarter of Lebanon’s GDP (Solidere 2011, p.7).  
 The regeneration of the city centre initially replaced the historical market area 
with a $300 million shopping mall, followed by banking area and then encompassed 
the waterfront, which contains many affluent gated residential communities. Solidere 
presented the reconstructed city centre as a symbol of postwar Lebanon’s aspiration to 
overcome its divisions and to rebuild a peaceful state (Makdisi, 1997). Solidere saw 
its mission as ‘a therapeutic role by founding the city on a sort of salvation-like 
amnesia that would protect it from the old ghosts which caused its destruction’ 
(Haugbolle, 2010, p.86). According to its masterplan, ‘Solidere is vested with a … 
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historical mission: restoring life to this vital part of the country, an important political 
and symbolic dimension’ that sustains national reconciliation and peacebuilding 
(Solidere, 2015).  
 While Approximately 30% of buildings in the historic downtown area were 
destroyed in the civil war, Solidere demolished 80% of those that survived. Solidere 
operated a ‘tabula rasa’ approach to the district that had the correlative effect of 
eliding what was considered as troubling memories of the city’s recent violent past. 
As noted by Makarem (2012), the reconstructed city centre is ‘void of any war-
memorials, war-museums or adequate public spaces for national mourning and 
remembrance’. 
 For critics, the amnesiac city centre derives a ‘detrimental impact on 
reconciliation and reintegration’ (Makarem, 2012), since it reinforces the logic of 
political forgetting about the civil war. As one social movement activist noted: ‘the 
downtown is the core of the reconstruction ideology – that we don’t need to look at 
the past. Yes, it is part of the amnesia’. The culture of silence, therefore, risks that 
violence is ‘more likely to be repeated’ (Khalaf, 2012, p.77). The reconstruction of 
the city centre further obscures and even reinforces the contemporary process of 
postwar ethnic segmentation and territorialisation of the city by constricting public 
space that could be used as vital meeting point for citizens to meet and interact.  
 
Nostalgia, haunted ruins and ghosts 
In a provocative thesis, Svetlana Boym (2001) distinguishes between two types of 
nostalgia: restorative and reflective. Restorative nostalgia signifies a return to the 
original stasis, to the prelapsarian moment and thus emphasizes nostos and the 
absolute truth. Such memory focuses on fixity, homogeneity and does not broach 
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ambiguity and ambivalence. Reflective nostalgia, alternatively, ‘dwells on the 
ambivalences of human longing and belonging and does not shy away from the 
contradictions of modernity’ (Boym, 2011, p.14). Reflective nostalgia encourages 
fluidity, the imperfect process of remembrance, and it lingers on ruins, the patina of 
time and history.  
 Restorative nostalgia captures the logic and affect of the regenerated city 
centre. Solidere’s restorative nostalgia, however, does not strive to restore the 
inclusive bourj; instead, its intention was to re-create a fantasized depiction of a pre-
war past, ‘to the happy Lebanon of the “good old days”’ (Makdisi, 1997, p.687). 
Solidere’s slogan: Beirut – ‘An Ancient City for the Future’ – sought to ‘create a new 
collective memory’ (Nagel, 2002, p.717) for the nation by paradoxically looking back 
to Beirut’s mythical heritage as a peaceful and affluent trading centre in the Middle 
East. Yet, rather than this restorative nostalgia re-establishing the ‘bourj’, it acted to 
conceal it. As such, the reconstruction process represented ‘a concerted effort to wipe 
clean the surface of central Beirut; to purify it of all historical associations in the form 
of its buildings; to render it pure space, pure commodity, pure real estate’ (Makdisi, 
1997, p.692). While the bourj is remembered as an ‘open space in which diverse 
groups can celebrate their differences without indifference to each other’ (Khalaf, 
2006, p.1), the effect of the nostalgic revamp was to sanitize the space. Rather than 
the ‘gathering place of all Beirutis from all backgrounds, the city centre is now an 
exclusive space for “appropriate” people only’ (Makarem, 2012). At the same time, 
the reconstruction sought to forget and replace the troubling memories of the civil war 
with ‘safe’ memories that supposedly antedate conflict.  
 The logic of restorative nostalgia does not stand uncontested. Non-sectarian 
social movements generate alternative forms of memorywork that counter exclusion 
16 
 
and amnesia. These movements articulate forms of reflective nostalgia and haunting 
to not only make visible what has been obscured through the reconstruction process, 
but to also irradiate radical alternatives for understanding and using the city (Nagle, 
2017). To further elaborate on reflective nostalgia, this mode of memory construction 
refuses to conform to singular narratives, but actively explores multiple and 
disordered ways of inhabiting places. Instead of returning to an imagined stasis and 
fixed point in time, reflective nostalgia indicates flexibility, imperfect memories and a 
willingness to cohabit with ghosts and haunted ruins. 
 An important example of a non-sectarian social movement that deploys 
reflective nostalgia and ghosts are activists that campaign to limit the privatization of 
public space and the expropriation of historic buildings in the city centre. There stand 
a number of historic buildings in the city centre which hosted violence during the civil 
war and which Solidere have been unable to gain property rights over. Notable is the 
26-floor Holiday Inn which was a major battleground for militias during the conflict 
and which now symbolizes ‘a de facto monument to destruction in a country whose 
leaders strive to forget the Civil War’ (Stoughton, 2014). These haunted buildings 
loom as anomalous memories within the cult of amnesia and nostalgia that dominates 
the reconstructed city centre and their mere existence powerfully disavows the wish 
of elites to administer forgetting.  
 A particularly important haunted ruin is the Yellow House in Beirut city 
centre. The building’s location at the interface between west and east Beirut made it a 
focal point for snipers during the war. Riddled by bullet holes, in the 1990s property 
developers planned to demolish the building. After a long campaign, in 2003 activists 
successfully forced the municipal authorities to requisition the building to stop it from 
falling into the hands of developers.  
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 Social movement activists seeking to protect the city’s architectural heritage 
saved the house, which they plan to use as a ‘Museum of Memory’ for the city. The 
Yellow House has become a major site of memory for non-sectarian social movement 
actors demanding that the state begins a process of dealing with the legacy of the civil 
war. For activists, the house, which was completed in 1932, represents the material 
evocation of Beirut’s recent history. While the building invokes an avant-garde 
fusion of architectural styles indicative of the city’s rich multicultural influences, the 
innovative design of the building allowed for various meanings and uses. In its 
original design, the building was constructed to curve around a corner of a main city 
centre junction. All of the building’s rooms look out across the city to give the viewer 
different vantage points. The building has a main cleavage that separates it into two 
wings, one looking at the Christian east of the city and the other peering at the 
Muslim west. The building’s panoramic city views, however, made it ideal for snipers 
during the civil war. A leading activist in the campaign to preserve the house 
explained: 
 
The building was a killing machine. The snipers used the transparency of the place, you could 
see into the street without drilling a hole in the wall … How brilliant that sniper was and how 
brilliant that architect was and what this overlap meant in a city seemed so contradictory. A 
building that was originally designed to interact with the city – to open up the city – and then 
the ingenuity of a sniper who used exactly that visual access to kill people in the city, to cut 
the city in two, and instead of making people interact with the city, it was used for killing. It 
was the same building but used for two different things (interview, June 2015). 
 
The building’s architectural cleavage – unified by an arched balcony – symbolized an 
even deeper level of meaning for the city’s contemporary history: the reproduction of 
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generational conflictual divisions and the citizenry’s rather hypocritical desire for 
unity. An activist explained: 
 
When you see the building from the outside, you see one building very well connected, but 
once you look at it from the inside you see that it has a very sharp cleavage, but at the same 
time, it’s so flimsy. It’s like the city that was always cut in two – be it the Christian East and 
Muslim West during the civil war, be it the people who are for or against reconstruction − it 
reflects these continuous divisions. But when you hear these factions, they always say they 
love each other, they want Lebanon to be one (interview, June 2015). 
 
The architecture of building, its polysemic meanings and varied usages offered a 
dramatic setting for a museum of Beirut’s divisive history. The museum’s potential to 
support a broader project of peacebuilding is outlined in a pamphlet created by 
activists: 
 
The acknowledgement of the whole past needs to be a principle entrenched within the 
collective consciousness of all communities. Making this reconciliation of the past visible, 
accessible and shared contributes to the process of social reconciliation (Beit Beirut, nd).  
 
For one activist, the museum’s proposed role in reconciliation is not only ‘a 
monument to the civil war; it’s not a place with a timeline where you say this 
happened or that happened, because as you know until today you don’t have any 
consensus of what happened’. Instead: 
 
This place has a healing property because it is a beautiful building that has been destroyed. It 
is an ingenious building that has been abused and you can see how something really important 
becomes used or abused for no reason. When you are there you are just forced to question the 
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fact of why you go through a war; just starting the debate is enough. Until today we have 
many initiatives to examine the civil war but they are very limited and on a small scale and 
have never happened on a national scale … We have fought to preserve the memory of the 
war (interview, June 2015).   
 
Boym (2001, p.61) writes that ‘Reflective nostalgia does not pretend to rebuild the 
mythical place called home … the home is in ruins or, on the contrary, has been just 
renovated and gentrified beyond recognition’. Reflective nostalgia, rather than 
articulating an impulse for a lost utopia, explores the runes of the past to explore 
moments of ambivalence, plurality and complexity in social identity that contradict 
simplistic, homogenous and singular historical narratives.  Reflective nostalgics 
‘perform a cultural exorcism, to shake up the historical myths revealing the 
mechanisms of seduction’ (Boym 2001, p.72). Thus, in using the Yellow House as a 
means to interrogate Beirut’s recent history, the objective is not to construct an 
artificial memory of the city as a place that was once peaceful and characterized by 
uniform interethnic tolerance and harmony. Instead, the Yellow House exposes a 
memory in which Beirut had the capacity to be both peaceful and conflictual, a city 
shaped simultaneously by multiple cultural influences and the potential of elites to 
instrumentalize ethnic identity in the service of sectarian political projects.  Moreover, 
rather than seek a superficial consensus regarding the civil war, the Yellow House 
expedites a discussion about how dissensus continues to shape postwar politics. 
 The campaigners to preserve the Yellow House view the ruin as a site that 
permits potential for city’s inhabitants to engage with the multiple factors that 
contributed to the civil war and, in so doing, to consider possibilities for future 
political action. The campaign to remember the war is also a fight against the 
expropriation of the city by private interests and former sectarian warlords. 
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I was fighting against the people who thought that it’s not worth preserving. The struggle to 
try and get the museum built symbolizes post-war Beirut, the fight against amnesia, the fight 
to preserve memory against money, the fight for history and identity that we are still facing 
every single day because we have no government and no hope (interview, June 2015). 
 
Public Space Memories 
The process of postwar city centre privatization went beyond the expropriation of 
buildings to claim public spaces. Nearly Solidere and other developers have 
privatized 800,000 sq. m of the city centre’s natural shoreline in the postwar era. In 
2013, developers fenced off a public space along the coastline known as Dalieh.  A 
campaigner to preserve public spaces explained to me that Dalieh attained 
‘sociocultural significance for the memory of the city and as one of the last natural 
open spaces that is not restricted’ (Interview, January 2016). The shrinkage of city 
centre public space derives critical importance in a divided city like Beirut which has 
witnessed the postwar creation of more ethnically homogeneous spaces, which have 
the effect of maintaining the power of ethnic leaders (Khalaf, 2012). 
 In November 2013 activists launched the ‘Civil Campaign to Protect the 
Dalieh of Raouche’. Activists represented a loose gathering of ‘individuals, 
environmental, cultural and civil groups who share a strong commitment to the 
preservation of Beirut’s shared spaces, ecological and cultural diversity as the pillars 
of the city’s liveability’. Many of the activists involved in the Dalieh campaign were 
heavily involved in the various campaigns against the privatization and/or destruction 
of historic buildings in the city centre in the aftermath of the civil war. Notably, the 
campaign featured a number of activist architects – many of whom had been involved 
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in the Yellow House – politically concerned with the deleterious effects of the 
reconstruction process. 
 In campaigning to preserve Dalieh as a public and shared space, campaigners 
view this activism contributing to peace since it facilitates not just intergroup contact, 
but also engagement of individuals across the sectarian divide. A non-sectarian 
activist explained to me: 
 
The Lebanese need meeting points. Today, what did we do in order to create physical and 
social meeting points since 1990? Nothing! This kind of savage privatization of the public 
space is just contributing to keeping the entrenchment and engulfment of each community and 
each group (interview, June 2015). 
 
 Yet, the issue of how exactly shared public space contributes to peacebuilding 
is indeterminate. Amin (2002) warns us from expecting too much from public spaces 
– ‘places of transit’ offering little meaningful or durable contact between strangers. 
While it’s correct not to overstate the ameliorative properties of public space, such 
spaces do perform a vital function in divided societies. Space that encourages ‘chance 
encounter, happenstance, the accidental and contingent, and allows for exploration 
and discovery’ can, over time, facilitate more porous boundaries between groups 
(Gaffikin, Mceldowney, & Sterrett 2010, p.498). Such spaces of encounter, it is 
hoped, can even contribute to the process of eroding the ‘visceral fear of “the other” 
that feeds conflict and separatism’ (Gaffikin, Mceldowney, & Sterrett, 2010, p.497). 
More than sites of chance meeting, public space in divided cities can evolve into 
‘dialogic space’: arenas for deliberate debate regarding how conflicts of different 
identities and interests can be resolved through identifying common political projects 
and values. 
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 In the memory of the city, Dalieh is presented by activists as a space that 
refuses to be sectarianized or exclusive and is instead a place of pluralism, tolerance 
and encounter. In one sense, such narratives reproduce legitimate concerns that the 
privatization of space compromises and diminishes the public realm. In another sense, 
these representations risk reproducing nostalgic ‘paradise lost’ visions of public space 
that elide the fact that these spaces were never fully public and were almost always a 
particular locus of class interests (Iveson, 2007). Nevertheless, as Iverson (2007) 
argues, the language of retrieval is a useful fiction in setting an ideal of public space, 
around which a city politics of inclusion can develop. These imaginative stories ‘of 
public space as life enhancing, exciting, safe and inclusive … can take us far in 
creating those spaces in just that way’ (Watson, 2006, p.7).  
 Thus, the social movement campaign asserts a memory of Dalieh as a place 
comprising various meanings for Beirutis. These memories act as plotlines through 
which the city can be reimagined as having public spaces that host multiple uses for 
its citizenry. The memorywork of the Civil Campaign to Protect the Dalieh of 
Raouche stress the complex rage of social groups that use this space. Activists note 
that Dalieh is used by fishermen and 10 families live on the shore; elderly swimmers 
access the sea to swim every day in the natural shallow pools; it is a place for lovers 
to surreptitiously meet and gay men to cruise; for families to picnic in the grassy hills; 
and a symbolic site for various ethnoreligious groups celebrating and commemorating 
religious events.  
 The project of reclaiming the city centre by non-sectarian movements also 
provides an immensely symbolic form of political contestation to challenge the logic 
and practices of postwar sectarian state. To expedite this political project, non-
sectarian movements invest their activism with memorywork and reflective nostalgia. 
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In the summer of 2015 more than 20,000 tonnes of uncollected rubbish amassed in 
Beirut. The problem of uncollected rubbish occurred as a result of the multi-ethnic 
power sharing failing to agree to extend the contract of the private company 
responsible for disposing the city’s trash. In response a new non-sectarian movement 
– You Stink – began a series of protests in Beirut city centre where they demanded 
the government’s resignation. For You Stink’s protestors, the issue of uncollected 
trash was symptomatic of the wider problems of dysfunctional, sectarian and corrupt 
governance. 150,000 Protestors – reported as ‘people from across the sectarian and 
political spectrum’ (Aljazeera, 2015) – were recorded at the city centre protests. You 
Stink quickly developed into a broad-based social movement that used the issue of 
trash to illuminate government paralysis and corruption and the success of the 
movement provided the impetus for activists to form Beirut’s first major non-
sectarian political party – Beirut Madinati (My Beirut). 
After one protest in the city centre, the general manager of Solidere 
complained of demonstrators ‘impeding the business of the commercial district in the 
Downtown’; he demanded the protestors vacate the city centre as they were 
‘cheapening’ it by transforming it into a new ‘Abu Rakhussa’ (Daily Star, 2015). The 
epithet ‘Abu Rakhussa’ – which translates as ‘father of the cheap’ – was the 
colloquialism to describe the working-class souks and flea markets that characterized 
the city centre before the reconstruction. In response to Solidere’s complaints, a You 
Stink activist stated: ‘We want to hold accountable everyone who robbed this country 
... and we want to reclaim Downtown Beirut for the people ... Al Bourj Square and the 
markets are coming back’ (Daily Star, 2015). For one night, thousands of activists 
recreated Abu Rakhussa in the city centre by setting up stalls to sell cheap homemade 
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goods. The performance of nostalgia illuminated the contemporary exclusivity of the 
upscale stores that dominate the downtown district.  
 
Belfast City Centre: Shared, Ethnicized Space and Titanic Town 
The conflict in Northern Ireland, which started in 1969 and formally ended with the 
Belfast peace agreement in 1998, left 3532 people dead and 47,541 injured (Murtagh 
and Boland, 2017, p.8). The conflict is driven by rival claims to national self-
determination with nationalists aspiring Irish unity and unionists seeking to maintain 
Northern Ireland’s status within the UK. Thus, ‘bi-polar, sectarian constructions of 
place and identity are principally at the root of the conflict in Northern Ireland’ 
(Stainer, 2006, p.103). Belfast hosted significant violence with 1400 deaths and over 
20,000 injured as a result of paramilitary and state violence (Shirlow and Murtagh, 
2006). Like Lebanon, the conflict hardened pre-existing territorial boundaries, 
especially in Belfast, where 99 physical barriers now separate groups (Murtagh and 
Boland, 2017, p.8). While a peace process occurred, today the city is ‘”post-violent” 
rather than “post-conflict” with a toxic mix of territoriality, poverty, paramilitarism 
and intensifying segregation in the most disadvantaged housing estates’ (Murtagh, 
2017). Public spaces are ‘subject to the practices and processes of territorial 
socialisation and used as a war by other means in postagreement struggles over 
identity, territory and belonging’ (McDowell, Braniff, and Hughes, 2017, p.196). 
 In contrast to Beirut’s cosmopolitan ‘bourj’, Belfast city centre evinces both 
an ambivalent and contested public memory. Like the bourj, Belfast city centre was 
historically an inclusive place where the citizenry could shop and socialize 
irrespective of ethnicity. Yet, at the same time, the city centre was essentially seen as 
a bastion of unionist political and cultural power. The city centre – which contained 
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the commercial, financial and political quarters of the city – was the main focus for 
unionist cultural events, such as commemorative parades. The city centre symbolised 
for Irish nationalists their exclusion from a unionist-dominated polity. A powerful 
way in which nationalists experienced marginalization from the city centre was by 
having their cultural and political events de facto banned from the city centre 
(Nagle, 2009a; McDowell, Braniff, and Hughes, 2017). During the conflict, the city 
centre ‘became something of a battlefield’ (Switzer & Hughes, 2009, p. 341) as 
militant organizations initiated bomb attacks on commercial targets resulting in the 
destruction of 300 retail outlets and over one quarter of the total retail floor space 
(Neill, 1995, p.54). Violence by all parties led to the deaths of 73 individuals. In 
response to the bombing campaign the security forces erected a ‘ring of steel’ around 
41 streets of the city centre with armed checkpoints. 
 The reconstruction of Belfast city centre became inextricably bound up with 
the complex and even contradictory aims of the peace process. During the conflict, 
urban planning was a security issue that prioritized stability to contain rather than 
transform the city’s sectarian divisions. The protection of the status quo maintained a 
rigid and sterile territoriality of segregation. The developing peace process provided 
an opportunity for policymakers to support peacebuilding in the city by formulating 
programmes designed to promote greater integration between the respective 
communities. Under the rubric of a ‘Shared Future’ – a consultation process to 
address communal divisions, segregation, and sectarianism – policymakers have 
fashioned strategies to build new mixed religion social housing, remove physical 
barriers and create shared spaces. Yet, as Bollens (2018) argues, attempts to 
operationalize national political goals of peace are frustrated by the city’s 
sectarianized spatial and territorial realities comprising a mosaic of local histories, 
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geographies, and power relationships. These dynamics disrupt mandates established 
to advance sustainable reconciliation. 
 Such integrative aspirations were further compromised by the accommodative 
character of the peace process formalized in the Belfast peace agreement of 1998. A 
fundamental principle of the peace process rested on recognizing and accommodating 
the respective identities and rights of Irish nationalists and unionists (Nagle and 
Clancy, 2010). The concept ‘parity of esteem’ captured the premise that intergroup 
reconciliation can be achieved by encouraging members of the two groups to respect 
the validity of each other’s cultural practices. This logic also permeated public policy 
regarding the use of public space. Belfast’s municipal city council advanced the idea 
that the city centre is a ‘shared space’: a place in which nationalists and unionists have 
equal access for cultural and political performances. The city council’s policy on 
public space aims to ‘encourage a tolerant and fair society, where people are 
respected and their differences are celebrated’ (Belfast City Council, 2005, p.18). 
 Although the municipal authorities encourage the use of the city centre for 
cultural events that foster a wider sense of civic identity that transcends ethnic 
divisions, the space is also imagined in a way that essentially ensures that both 
groups’ – nationalists and unionists – identities are equally accommodated. The 
strategy for Belfast city centre is rooted in the logic that nationalist and unionist 
groups should respect intergroup diversity by accepting the right of each other to use 
public space. This largely refers to nationalist and unionist political and cultural 
events which are exclusive to their own constituency. Yet, rather than contribute to 
conflict resolution, the city centre has become a zero-sum space in which its usage by 
one ethnonational groups is experienced as a loss by the rival group. Thus, issues over 
27 
 
parades and the flying of flags, have become major points of violent contention in the 
city centre (McDowell, Braniff, & Hughes, 2017). 
 These ethnonationalist events are typically commemorative parades that use 
social memory to legitimate exclusivist political narratives. Irish nationalist and 
unionists remember talismanic dates from the past to imprint a quality of timelessness 
surrounding conflict thus rendering it impervious to contemporary efforts to craft 
political solutions. By focussing on traumatic memories, the rival groups proclaim 
victimhood to remind the ethnic community to never compromise, and that defensive 
action is always legitimate to ensure communal survival (Nagle, 2009b).  
 The city centre was further invested with peace process politics through the 
dynamics of regeneration and gentrification. Similar to Beirut, Belfast city centre has 
undergone extensive postconflict reconstruction. The city’s leaders promote the 
regenerated city centre as representative of a late modern cosmopolitan city rather 
than one riven by sectarian violence and intolerance. This rebranding of the city 
centre reflected the peace process in complex ways. The British state were 
preoccupied, as a strategy to end violence, with building solidarity across middle-
class lines, thereby firmly locating the conflict in lower-income groups. Through 
constructing class rather than ethnic solidarity, the aim was to shift the city’s middle-
class from local to global concerns, ‘a shift that mirrors the city's overall economic 
transformation from traditional industrial production to flexible post-modern methods 
of accumulation’ (Carter, 2003, p.256).  
 From the 1990s onwards a number of new major infrastructure projects were 
established in Belfast city centre under the auspices of the Laganside Corporation, a 
public body set up to carry out the regeneration of the district.  Between 1989 and 
2007, approximately £1 billion was invested into the reconstruction, including the 
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building of a major mall and the commercial gentrification of Belfast’s riverfront, the 
Laganside, in a model borrowed from London’s Docklands. For a British politician, 
the creation of a commercially vibrant city centre would facilitate ‘safe areas where 
both communities could mix and match’ (Needham, 1998, p.168). The state thus 
hoped to ‘build a shared sense of civic pride … among people whose attitudes …. 
may well be mutually antagonistic ... radiating a sense of citizenship outward to a 
divided population’ (Hadaway, 2001). 
 The regeneration process expanded by creating  ‘Cathedral’, ‘Laganside’, and 
the ‘Titanic Quarters’, which are designated as ‘character zones’ supposed to 
stimulate ‘cultural reanimation’ and the ‘local economy’ (Belfast City Council, 2004). 
Although the Titanic Quarter lies at the edge of the city centre, it is a £7billion, 185-
acre site located on former shipyards, which contains 180,000 square meters of leisure 
space, including a heritage centre. Opened in 2012, the Titanic Quarter is a slice of 
nostalgia, ‘a reverie of the past’ (Belfast Telegraph, 2009), intended to celebrate an 
era before the violent conflict when Belfast was an industrial powerhouse. Such forms 
of regeneration strive to make ‘memory and identity as objects of public attention’, 
seeking ways of constructing ‘emotional attachment to places and periods from the 
past’ as a means of building civic and community solidarities (Nash and Williams 
2011, p.100). 
 Analogous to the critiques of Beirut city centre’s reconstruction, scholars 
argue that the ‘ethnocratic reconstruction’ of Belfast city centre hides the on-going 
‘injustices of segregation and socio-spatial exclusion’ (Shirlow, 2006, p.101) evident 
in the outlying working-class areas of the city. While the rebranded city centre is 
portrayed as a ‘neutral, modernising place that has left its parochial sectarianism 
behind’ (see Murtagh, 2008, p.3), a correlative process is occurring in the rest of the 
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city in which social and political life is increasingly subject to division on ethnic lines. 
In addition, the gentrification process is accused of generating ‘a degree of forgetting, 
at least in Belfast’s city centre’ (Switzer & McDowell, 2009). The new aesthetics 
‘seek to induce historical amnesia’ (Neill, 1992, p.9). This wiping clean of the city 
centre’s past involves not only the removal of the scars of violence, but more 
fundamentally by the absence of visible memorials of the Troubles-related acts of 
violence that have occurred there (Switzer and McDowell, 2009). 
 Thus, a core contradiction lies at heart of the regeneration process: Belfast city 
centre has simultaneously been re-ethnicized and de-ethnicized, with both memory 
and nostalgia shaping these dynamics. On the one hand, during the peace process the 
city centre was made into a shared space that accommodated the politico-
commemorative practices of both ethnonationalist groups: nationalists and unionists. 
On the other hand, the gentrification process sought to elide sectarianism and replace 
it with a globalized identity that is also, paradoxically, localized and nostalgic.  
 Yet, as in Beirut, the space of Belfast city centre provides an arena for non-
sectarian movements to perform memorywork that generates alternatives to the 
divisive politics of ethnic remembrance and neoliberal amnesia. An important 
example of such a movement is the socialist May Day parade that takes place 
annually in Belfast city centre. The May Day parade is organized by the Irish 
Congress of Trade Unions. A key aim of the movement is to make working class 
nationalists and unionists see their identity and interests as class based and unified 
rather than ethnic and competing. An organizer of the May Day parade explained: 
 
I would see it as challenging the two-community [nationalist and unionist] idea. I think that 
what we have strived to do is to create a safe space for people of all religions and none to 
come together to mark their relationship as working people rather than as Catholics, as 
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Protestants, as atheists, whatever ... We have said ‘it’s a non-sectarian, non-denominational 
march’  (interview, 2007). 
 
Alongside mobilizing on local issues, the May Day event links to global labour 
movement, in which alliances outside nationally focussed trade unionism campaign 
against ‘state deregulation, informalisation and flexibilsation, all in the context of 
neoliberal globalization’ (Lier and Stokke, 2006, p.802). A leading activist described 
the range of issues that the movement seeks to highlight through the parade: 
‘economic justice and workplace justice …. as we move into a global market, 
globalized society, issues of global solidarity and justice and racism; issues of third-
world debt, issues relating to child poverty, HIV AIDS’. This diversity is augmented 
by the array of participating groups: trade unions, but also anti-war groups, nationalist 
and unionist groupings, the Anti-Racist Network, the Anarchist Black Cross, 
Environmentalists, the Northern Irish Gay Rights Association, the Cuba Support 
Group Ireland, among many others. The march is described as: ‘rejecting sectarianism 
and celebrating diversity in Northern Ireland. [It] is seen as one of the few marches in 
Northern Ireland which has been designed to embrace participation from people of 
different backgrounds’ (Belfast Telegraph, 2003). 
 The annual May Day parade historically routes through Belfast city centre. In 
a society where ethnonational interests are dominant, the manifestation of the parade 
in this space represents the visibility of non-sectarian politics and identities in the 
public sphere. An organizer of May Day compared the parade to the act of ‘coming 
out’ for people who are non-sectarian and socialist: 
 
What you do when you take part in that May Day parade is that you are expressing some 
notions of your identity, the people you feel solidarity to are based upon the class and also 
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importantly the common humanity, and I think that is quite  important that it happens every 
year, especially in Belfast ... In Northern Ireland it takes a hell  of a conscious choice to go out 
and say, ‘right, this year is the one day I’m going out and I’m  going to walk through the 
middle of the town’. In a way, one of the reasons I love marching in the parade is that you 
hold up traffic and say: ‘actually, this is our town and our streets for this day’ (interview, 
2007).  
 
The May Day parade deploys the power of memory, ghosts and reflective memory to 
challenge the understanding that politics and identity in the city are perpetually 
circumscribed by ethnic interests. The May Day organizers have used 
commemorative practices that emphasize memories to stimulate cross-community 
solidarity.  
 The 2007 May Day parade, for instance, was a commemoration to mark the 
100th anniversary of Belfast’s 1907 Dockers and Carters’ strike. The strike of 1907 
featured unskilled nationalist and unionist workers in the city uniting over trade union 
rights. The temporary formation of a united working class was notable in a city where 
the population and workforce were divided along sectarian lines. While the 1907 
strike peaked with a march of over 250,000 to the city centre, the lockout ended in 
bitter and violent circumstances as sectarian sentiment was used by the state and 
employers to enforce divide and rule among the strikers.  
 The 2007 parade gathered in Custom House Square, a civic space in the city 
centre that was once dubbed ‘Red Square’ since it historically hosted radical events 
and union leaders addressed crowds in the square during the 1907 strike. A permanent 
statue of a strike leader has now been placed on the steps of Custom House, a figure 
of the speaker addressing the crowd. This memorial is significant in a city which has 
undergone an intensification of sectarian memoryscapes with more than 200 
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permanent murals, plaques and memorials constituted in Belfast alone since 1998 by 
the rival nationalist and unionist groups (McDowell, Braniff, & Hughes, 2017). The 
2007 parade, which departed from Custom House, was led by children dressed as 
dockworkers from the strike era. The route of the 2007 May Day parade through the 
city centre, which also skirted outlying working-class districts, purposely copied the 
massed marches of 1907. When the 2007 march passed the bottom of the Shankill 
Road (a working-class unionist district) and the Falls Road (a working-class 
nationalist district) the organizers left a wreath to commemorate all workers killed in 
sectarian conflict since 1907. Such use of commemorative practice inscribed through 
the performance of street performance can provide alternative visions of history for 
present exigencies. A May Day organizer explained to me: 
 
One of the lessons of 1907 that we’re looking at now: Catholics and Protestants of the 
workplace are better off when they are not divided; that the boss class will always try and 
divide us along sectarian lines as they tried to do so in 1907; as an organization we can have a 
commitment to do anything it wants (interview, 2007). 
 
Yet, while the May Day parade organizers use memory and nostalgia to disrupt and 
voice alternatives to narratives that portray Belfast as an interminably divided and 
sectarian city, the movement has often been unable to receive public funding from the 
city’s ‘Community Festivals Fund’ since the funders believe that May Day does not 
qualify as a ‘geographical community’ in the same way that nationalist and unionist 
groups can claim.  Such reified definitions of community largely conspire to ensure 
that ethnonational interests dominate. In response, the May Day organizers argue that 
although the workers’ movement was not a ‘geographic community’, it is a 
‘community of interest’ that is not bounded by specific spaces: 
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we argue we that we are united as a community by a common interest, common goals. Yes, 
we have differences, but we are united because we have these common ideas and ethos and 
principles (interview, 2007). 
 
Analogous to the non-sectarian movements in Beirut, the May Day parade does not 
evoke nostalgia and remembrance to construct a simple representation of the past. 
Indeed, the objective of commemorating the 1907 Belfast strike is not to summon up 
a romanticized prelapsarian time when class rather than ethnic politics were the 
principle mode of organization and identity in the city. Instead, as Boym (2001, p.61) 
notes, ‘reflection suggests new flexibility, not the reestablishment of stasis’. Thus, the 
May Day commemoration stimulates a discussion about how and why non-sectarian 
political movements can emerge in a city characterized by ethnic violence; the long-
term consequence of such activism; and, equally important, why class-based activism 
may fail, especially in the face of sectarian counter-mobilization. In other words, the 
MayDay commemoration of the 1907 strike accepts that Belfast is historically a 
divided city, it equally is also remembers a more nuanced situation in which cross-
cleavage action can momentarily appear. It also realistically deals with the violent 
history of the city in which such cross-community politics have been ruthlessly 
targeted and defeated. It also encourages reflection among trade unionists and 
socialists to consider their own limitations and failure in successfully eradicating 
sectarianism in the city. 
 The May Day commemorative parade generates an awkward symmetry with 
the regenerated city centre. As noted earlier, the reconstruction process included the 
development of the Titanic Quarter, which features the Titanic heritage museum. The 
building of the Titanic in Belfast’s shipyards began in 1908, the year following the 
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dockers’ strike. While the Titanic museum is intended to attract international tourists 
captivated by the ill-fated ship, it also provides a contrasting form of nostalgia to the 
May Day parade. One exhibition, for example, called ‘Boomtown Belfast’ 
nostalgically ruminates on the period that the Titanic was built, highlighting that the 
city was an industrial and economic powerhouse of the British Empire (Neil, 2011). 
Yet, this memory elides the historical record of thousands of Catholic workers being 
expelled from the shipyards as sectarian violence coexisted with moments of class 
solidarity.  
 
Conclusion 
Beirut and Belfast provide means to understand both the consequences of postwar 
reconstruction of space and the dynamics of resistance and creativity engendered by 
social movement actors. One of the salient features of the rebuilding process is the 
programming of nostalgic amnesia into these city centres. This seemingly paradoxical 
nexus between nostalgia and amnesia is evident in the postconflict branding exercises 
of state and commercial enterprises in the two cities. Such nostalgia can be 
understood in terms of Boym’s notion of ‘restorative nostalgia’, in which memory is 
constructed as unified, community affirming, unambiguous and its purpose is to point 
the way back to a lost mythical past. In so doing, the effect of restorative nostalgia is 
to generate reveries that efface these cities’ recent and enduring violent histories and 
reinforce increasing sectarianism and socioeconomic disparities.   
 Yet attempts to instil restorative nostalgia are incomplete. Various non-
sectarian movement actors deploy ‘reflective nostalgia’, forms of memory 
emphasizing uncertainty, hybridity, cosmopolitanism and complexity that challenge 
homogenous nationalist and neoliberal imaginaries. As I have highlighted in this 
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paper, such reflective nostalgia is the figure of the ghost, manifestations that disrupt 
‘the reifications through which performances, narratives, and experiences of memory 
become fixed in space’ (Edensor, 2005, p.929). They are ‘haunting reminders’ of the 
violence and the complex social relations in which we live (Gordon, 1997, p.25). 
Non-sectarian movements which evoke ghostly presences and enter haunted 
buildings, I argue, not only unsettle restorative nostalgia/amnesia but also use 
memory to fashion new narratives of the city that can even support peacebuilding.  
 For peacebuilding to take root, Iveson (2007) calls for ‘new scripts’ to change 
the perception and social use of space in divided cities. Such a vision connects with 
Lefebvre’s (1991) demand that the most important thing is to multiply the readings of 
the city – to provide pluralistic narratives in which the city is a site of renewed 
centrality, a place of encounter and difference which licenses the full usage of spaces 
for all of the citizenry regardless of background. In order to change how spaces are 
made accessible to the citizenry in the future requires changing the memories 
associated with them in the present. The ‘right to represent the past … can be 
considered a right-to-the-city’ (Till, 2012, p.8). The right-to-the-city, argued 
Lefebvre, required social movements to re-appropriate and re-program public space –
to fight against ‘specialized space and a narrow localization of function’ (Lefebvre, 
1991, p.382–383). One important way in which the social movements included in this 
paper contribute to this project of re-imagining the city is by impressing memories 
into city centre public space that illuminate complex, awkward and disordered 
histories of the city that defy sectarian and amnesiac visions.  
 While it’s imperative to rebuild spaces of sectarian violence into shared 
spaces, this requires a critical praxis that is not limited to accommodating shared 
consumers or the memorywork rival ethnic groups. Research on urban planning in 
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divided societies provides a number of important policies at the structural level 
(Bollens, 2018). At the same time, non-sectarian actors can engender new ways of 
understanding how these spaces can be used through memorywork. If judiciously 
mobilized, these memories can become ‘routes for forging new cosmopolitan 
identities and transcending loyalties and commitments’ (Khalaf, 2012, p.79). 
Although it is important not to overemphasize the impact of non-sectarian actors, they 
can develop into powerful networks that sustain social and political transformation. 
Activists in Beirut have halted an estimated $1bn of privatization projects and non-
sectarian activists involved in women’s movements, public space and public services 
formed a new political party, Beirut Madinati, which gained over 30% of votes in the 
2016 municipal elections. In Belfast, the non-sectarian socialist party, People Before 
Profit, won two seats in the Northern Ireland government in 2016. Rather than 
irrelevant political protagonists, such examples show the emerging power of these 
movements. 
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